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Much recent literature has been devoted to providing theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
proposition that government is ‘too large’. Far less attention has been paid to the issue of 
whether tax and expenditure limitations, such as those in effect in many US. states, are an 
appropriate remedy to excessive government size. This paper uses conventional tools of welfare 
economics to analyze the welfare effects of tax limitations in an economy made up of many local 
governments. The conclusions are mixed: where government charges monopoly prices, tax 
limitation will reduce welfare; where government provides outputs that exceed those that would 
be competitively supplied, tax limitation may improve welfare. 
1. Introduction 
In the past few years a large number of scholars have written an even 
larger number of papers and books concerned with the question of whether 
government has become too large. Much of this work has sought to identify 
the means by which government might reach excessive size. However, there 
has also been some attention paid to the question of whether there are 
mechanisms which will tend to limit the growth of government.’ To the 
extent that there is a consensus in this literature, it is that the institutions of 
representative democracy, coupled with the institutions of bureaucracy, make 
it plausible that the absolute size of government will exceed that predicted by 
the standard median voter model of public finance. Furthermore, a related 
empirical literature suggests that the wages of government employees are in 
many cases higher than would be predicted by the standard human capital 
model.’ 
While scholars have been finding theoretical reasons for believing 
government to be too large, and empirical support for the proposition that 
*We wish to thank Anthony Atkinson, Edward Gramlich and two anonymous referees for 
their comments. We are also grateful to the National Science Foundation and the Office of 
Policy Development and Research of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, both 
of which helped to support this research. 
‘See, for example, Niskanen (1971, 1975); Tullock (1974); Buchanan and Tullock (1974); 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979); Borcherding (1977); Fiorina and Noll (1978): and Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979). 
‘See Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) and Smith (1977). 
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government employees are too expensive, voters and legislatures in many 
states of the United States have expressed beliefs consistent with these 
findings. Measures restricting the growth and/or level of taxing and spending 
have been made part of the constitutions of a number of states, and have 
been adopted as statutes in many others.3 Surprisingly, there has been little 
research into the question of whether statutory or legislative restrictions on 
taxation and expenditure as a whole are an appropriate policy response 
when government is ‘too large’.s The question is an important one. since it is 
not obvious that welfare will be enhanced by a broad tax or expenditure 
limitation, even if the jurisdiction to which such a limitation applies does 
have a public sector that is superoptimal in size or whose employees earn 
monopoly rents. At the same time it does seem obvious that tax and 
expenditure limitation reduces the ability of the fist to respond to changing 
needs and tastes. 
The purpose of this paper is to apply standard tools of welfare economics 
in order to determine the circumstances under which tax limitation can be 
expected to improve or worsen economic welfare given that the level of 
public spending and/or the wages received by public employees are higher 
than would obtain in a first best optimum. Not surprisingly, we find that the 
effectiveness of the tax limitation ‘cure’ depends on the specifics of the 
‘disease’ of too much government. Where the problem is Niskanen-like 
bureaucratic aggrandizement, tax limitation is likely to improve economic 
welfare. Where dissatisfaction with government stems from public employees’ 
ability to earn economic rent, on the other hand, tax limitation is likely to 
decrease economic welfare. Where the ability of public employees to earn 
rents is positively related to the size of public sector, the effect of tax 
limitation is ambiguous ~ it will depend on the details of the way in which 
the public sector is organized. 
In section 2 of the paper we lay out the model in which the preceding 
results are established. We consider an economy made up of many small 
jurisdictions, open to both migration and trade, each of which produces both 
a consumption good and a pure (local) public good. In section 3 we use the 
model to consider the question (generally noi asked in the literature) of 
whether it is possible for public employees to earn rents in a system that is 
fully open to trade and migration. We show that under certain conditions 
(but not all conditions) rents can be earned, since one of the factors of 
production, land, is immobile. 
In section 4 we consider the effects of tax limitation on a central 
government, by considering the single-jurisdiction fixed population variant of 
‘The most famous of these measures, and the most restrictive, is California’s Proposition 13. 
But many states have passed legislative restrictions on local government spending since 1970 or 
have altered their constitutions to limit or curtail state and/or local spending. 
‘An exception is Ladd (1978). 
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our model. We sketch out the broad conclusion of our paper, namely that 
tax limitation tends to make the private sector worse off when rent-earning is 
the cause of the public sector suboptimality, but that the private sector is 
made better off when public output is ‘too large’. These results are clarified 
and expanded in sections 5 and 6 in which the tax limitation of local 
government is considered. In section 5 we consider the effects of local tax 
limitation when public employees have bargaining power over their wages, 
but the size of the public budget is set by the private sector, while in section 
6 we evaluate cases in which public employees have at least some control 
over public sector size. In both sections 5 and 6 the central government 
analysis can be viewed as a special case yielding essentially similar results. 
Section 7 contains some conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
Before turning to the formal model a brief digression on the meaning of 
the assertion that ‘government is too large’ will be useful. It seems to us that 
there are three rather distinct cases which are often confused, both in the 
press and the academic literature on the subject. 
Assume that there is a public good G, produced by means of a production 
function that is strictly increasing in the level of public employment, E,. 
Assume further that voters in a jurisdiction have utility functions defined on 
G and a private consumption good C, that they have incomes Y and face a 
known tax price P. For simplicity, we also assume that all voters who are 
not members of the public sector have identical tastes. In this simple context, 
government can be too large in any or all of the following three ways. 
(1) The most analyzed case, first considered in detail by Niskanen (1971) 
is one in which the level of G provided in the community exceeds that which 
would be demanded by voters with their given incomes, tastes and tax prices. 
This is also the case which is closest to that considered by Romer and 
Rosenthal (1979). The mechanisms which permit excess production of G stem 
from the ability of bureaucrats to make ‘all or nothing’ offers (or in the case 
of Romer and Rosenthal, all or not enough) regarding the level of G. 
Bureaucrats in these models are assumed to want to have large bureaus and 
are not particularly concerned with high wages for either themselves or their 
employees. Thus, in this simplest case government is too large in the very 
basic sense that there is more public output than would be chosen if voters 
could purchase public goods on competitive terms, and the agents perceived 
to be responsible for the excessive level of output are public managers. 
(2) The second way in which government might be considered too large is 
that the wages of public employees are higher than they would be if they 
were determined competitively, and thus the tax price P facing voters is 
artificially high. Thus, public budgets are high because rents are earned by 
public employees. Here the motivation is simple greed on the part of public 
employees (rather than a desire .for bigness for its own sake on the part of 
public managers) and the mechanisms used to achieve rents are some mix of 
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collective bargaining and political power on the part of public sector unions. 
This is the case considered in Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979). 
(3) A third way in which government may be too large is that it may be 
inefficient in the sense that government is not on its production frontier. 
With the exception of Fiorina and No11 (1978), there has been essentially no 
scholarly literature on the mechanisms by which such inefficiency might arise, 
although its existence is clearly on the minds of voters according to some 
survey results we have obtained in other work.5 In this case government is 
perceived to be too large because there is waste, i.e. an inferior technology is 
being used, or the public sector is simply not on its production frontier. This 
resembles case 2 in that in both cases the marginal cost of a unit of public 
output will be higher than is optimal. But, it is conceptually quite distinct in 
that waste and inefficiency are not the result of an attempt by public 
employees to earn monopoly rents. The perception of waste in government is 
also quite different from the perception that there is excessive government 
output. On the contrary, the perception of waste suggests that there is 
insufficient government output given the real physical inputs employed.6 
Unfortunately, we find this third case by far the most difficult to model, in 
part because there is no one agent whose behavior is obviously responsible 
for an inefficiency of this type. Thus, our paper focuses solely on the first two 
cases individually and in combination. We now turn to development of the 
model which we use to analyze these effects. 
2. The model 
Assumption 1. There are N locations in the economy,7 indexed by i 
= 1,. ., N. Each of these locations contains an identical fixed amount of land, 
ji, the quantity of which is normalized at unity. 
Assumptioi7 2. At each location a consumption good (c) is produced by 
means of a technology which is homogeneous of degree one in inputs land 
and labor, twice continuously differentiable, with a diminishing marginal 
product of each factor. 
‘The survey was admmistered to 2001 Michigan residents immediately after an election in 
which three tax limitation type amendments were on the ballot [see Courant, Gramlich and 
Rubinfeld (1980)]. In the survey respondents were asked whether people in state government 
waste money. Of all respondents, 49 percent thought there was a lot of waste, while 43 percent 
thought there was some waste. 
“We should note that our survey results also make it clear that most voters thought that 
certain public services ought to be increased while others ought to be decreased. To what extent 
these opinions are due to beliefs about over and underproduction or waste is unclear, but it 
would take a more involved model with a multiple output government sector to pursue the issue 
further. 
‘In the discussion that follows, location, urban area and city are used Interchangeably. 
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Since land is fixed in our analysis it will simplify matters to write the 
production function for the consumption good solely in terms of labor 
devoted to production of that good (e,). Thus, 
ci =.f(eb) (i=l,...,N), (1) 
where the superscript denotes the location i, .f“>O, and f”‘<O (i.e. f( ) is 
strictly concave). The price of the consumption good is normalized at unity; 
thus, all other prices are measured in units of the consumption good. 
Assumption 3. At each location a pure public good may be produced by 
means of a technology which is linear in the amount of labor employed in 
the public sector. Again to simplify, the output of the public sector is 
measured by the amount of labor (e,) devoted to it. 
Assumption 4. The total population of the economy is fixed; all individuals 
have identical endowments of human capital; all individuals supply equal 
amounts of labor. Thus, the total amount of labor in the economy is fixed at 
Z. All labor is employed either in the private or public sector at some 
location, so that 
and 
; e’=&T. (3) 
i= I 
Assumption 5. All workers have identical quasi-concave and twice 
differentiable utility functions, fI(c,ep), monotonically increasing in both the 
consumption good and the level of public output. 
Assumption 6. Both labor and the consumption good are costlessly mobile 
among locations. 
Assumptions 7. The markets for private sector labor, land, and the 
consumption good are perfectly competitive. 
From assumption 7 it follows that 
w; =.f’(gJ, (4) 
where wb is the wage earned by workers in the consumption good industry 
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at location i. From assumptions 2, 6 and 7, land rental prices, I-‘. can be 
determined as a residual. i.e. 
It should be noted explicitly here that income attributable to land must 
either accrue to absentee landlords who are not blessed with utility functions. 
or be distributed uniformly to the population. In either case, both private 
and public sector employees will have identical incomes if the labor market is 
perfectly competitive at all locations. Explicit assumptions about land income 
will be made later in the text. 
Finally, assumptions 5, 6 and 7 imply that the level of utility achieved by 
private sector workers must be equal at all locations. Thus. using the 
subscript p to denote the private sector 
u(r~;,el,,=u(c;,ej,, (i,j= 1 . . . N 1. (6) 
where U( ) is the utility function. 
Assurnptiorr 8. Employees working in the public sector may possess market 
power such that they can restrict entry and simultaneously raise their wage 
rate above that of private sector employees in the same location. (This 
market power will in general be different in different locations.) If they do 
not possess market power, then assumption 5 implies that their wage in 
location i, (wi) will be equal to the private sector wage (~b). 
Ass~rnption 9. Public expenditures are financed by a head tax,8 so that the 
public budget is balanced at each location. Thus, the tax bill per employee at 
location i is 
,$,i ,i iei, 
6 %’ 
Later in the paper we will find it convenient to assume the existence of 
absentee landlords. For the purposes of this section, however, it is important 
that we consider the behavior of the model when all income accrues to 
agents with utility functions. Thus we adopt: 
Assurnptiort 10. Title to the N units of land in the system is held equally by 
all members of the labor force, such that each worker owns l/C of the land in 
each location.’ Thus, the landholdings of each person are N;E. 
‘We use a head tax for analytical convenience. The model yields sintiltrr qditctrrrr results 
under a proportional income tax. 
“Noting that land scrvcs the role of both land and capital in this model. this assumption is 
equivalent to assuming that each indwidual diversifies his/her portfoho of holdings among 
different lirms in the same industry. 
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2.1. Solution in the perfectly competitive case 
Stiglitz (1977) has shown that in models of the type considered here there 
is a nonconvexity in the production set facing society. The nonconvexity 
arises from the fact that as the population of any city is increased it becomes 
cheaper (in terms of units of the consumption good per capita) to produce 
the public good. If tastes for the public good are strong enough, optimal 
population size will be infinite (and in our model only one city will be 
inhabited). In addition, there are a number of cases under which equilibria 
will not be optima, and in which there will be multiple equilibria and/or 
optima.’ O 
As a practical matter, the case in which optimal population is infinite is 
not very interesting. With free migration, there is nothing to prevent N - 1 
cities being uninhabited. The opposite polar case, in which optimal 
population size is zero, is also uninteresting. (There are, after all, many cities 
in most developed economies, each providing local public goods.) However, 
the possibility that there are not enough cities, implying that population will 
generally be superoptimal, is more serious, although it can be ruled out if it 
is assumed that in the long run communities may be formed freely.” Partly 
as a reflection of reality, and also for analytical tractability, we adopt: 
Assumption 11. There exists a finite optimal population size, e* =2/N. 
Assumption 11 ensures that an equal allocation of population across 
communities will be an optimum. Because optimality requires that the 
quantities of eg and c chosen in each city maximize utility given the city’s 
population, and because the production set for any given population is 
convex and the utility functions are assumed to be quasi-concave, it follows 
that with perfect competition the level of e, (and C) in each city will be the 
same with a uniform allocation of population. This, in turn, implies that the 
marginal product of private sector labor (w,) must be equal everywhere, and 
the absence of public employee market power under perfect competition 
implies that wp must equal u‘~. 
Assumption 11 also ensures that an equal allocation of population to 
communities will be an equilibrium. No agent can increase utility by 
migrating, because the level of utility is the same everywhere. Moreover, if 
someone did migrate, there would be a (small) loss in utility in both 
communities involved. 
“It should be noted that these problems do not arise if the goods and services provided 
publicly are in fact private in character. Empirical work by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) indicate that indeed this may be the case. If congestion affects 
the consumption of the publicly provided good in the same way that it affects the consumption 
of the private good (e.g. if G =e,/e), then the production possibility frontier will be globally 
convex given the other assumptions made above. 
“See Epple, Zelenitz and Visscher (1978) for a model using such an assumption. 
Given N identical locations, each with the same initial labor force, we can 
characterize the behaviour of the system as a whole by looking at public 
employee behavior at one location. In doing so we drop the use of 
superscripts and (to simplify) assume competitive public sector behavior at 
all other locations. At each location each of the F/N consumers will have 
identical wage incomes. Of course that wage level depends on the allocation 
of labor between the public and private sector. since the wage paid in the 
private sector must be equal to the value marginal product of labor. 
The problem facing any resident is to maximize utility subject to the 
constraint that expenditures on the consumption good plus expenditures on 
the public good are equal to the sum of land and labor income. Given that 
public goods are financed by a head tax, and that land rents are initially 
equalized everywhere. the budget constraint for those employed in the 
private sector may be written as:l’ 
In the case under consideration the subscripts ‘p’. denoting private sector, 
are of course superfluous since the relevant variables have the same values for 
public sector employees. More generally, however, eq. (7) as written is the 
constraint facing private employees, and the same equation, with ‘g’ replacing 
‘p’, would be the constraint facing public employees. 
Maximization of the utility function (6) subject to (7) yields the familiar 
condition that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods must 
equal the price ratio. Under the head tax, the price of eI! is simply W./P; thus, 
where the subscripts on the utility function denote the respective partial 
derivatives. Not surprisingly, rearrangement of (8) yields the familiar 
condition that CMRS = MRT. 
Given a value of e (in the case under consideration F/N), eqs. (I), (2), (4), 
(5), (6) and (8) determine P,,, e,, I$‘~, r, c, and U,. the level of utility attained. 
Throughout the remainder of this paper we will be considering situations 
in which public employees exercise market power in location 1, leading to 
12When land rents vary by location, the condition becomes 
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the outmigration of private employees from that location. Since the ‘rest of 
the world’ will be assumed to remain completely competitive, any 
outmigration will be uniformly distributed among the remaining N - 1 
locations and each of these locations will behave identically to each other. 
Because there is costless migration, equilibrium will require that private 
employees in location 1 achieve the same level of utility as private employees 
in the rest of the economy. If N is large, the loss of individual utility attained 
in the rest of the world due to migration to city 1 will be negligibly small, as 
in the familiar open city model. Thus, in analyzing behavior in location 1, we 
will adopt the standard convention in such models that utility is given as a 
parameter and that other variables (notably income and prices) must adjust 
so as to equalize the utility attained by private sector employees, with the 
adjustment mechanism involving migration and a concave production 
function for c. 
We stress that utility losses are not zero, however, because unequal 
allocations of population are not optimal by assumption 11. If the 
production set facing each community were convex, even with variable 
population (as would be the case if the publicly provided good were a 
private good) the utility loss for all private employees would be increasing in 
the level of the population in the N - 1 cities which comprise the ‘rest of the 
world’, and hence be increasing in the amount of outmigration from city 1. 
In the context of this model, the nonconvexity in the production sets due to 
the presence of pure public goods makes it possible that utility will not be 
monotonically decreasing in outmigration. This possibility can be ruled out, 
however, if it can be shown that there are no local pessima as a function of 
population size. In our model [as in Stiglitz (1977)], a sufficient condition for 
a unique optimum can be characterized in terms of the elasticity of 
substitution in consumption between c,/e and eg and the elasticity of 
substitution in the production function. The condition in our model will be 
met if both elasticities are strictly less than unity.‘j 
We assume, then, that for population sizes between C/N and F(N - l), that 
condition (vi) in footnote 13 holds. If utility is further assumed to be a 
“Define 




continuous function of population size, this condition is sufficient to 
establish. 
This result will permit us to use the level of outmigration from location 1 
as a (negative) utility index in comparing the effects of different assumptions 
concerning public employee market power and tax limitation. 
2.3. Solzrrio/l qf the r?7ot/c/ tt~itll tr/wr7tf’c’ IL4lld/OldS 
Assumption 10 was made for the purpose of showing that when a 
nonoptimal allocation of labor is employed in the system as a whole and all 
income is returned to workers. utility must fall. The Pareto efficiency of a 
The term in bracket5 ~~111 he ncgati\e if 
dl, 
@< 
_ <,, ” 
d‘, , ’ _<>, ” 
From the definition of the ela\tlcity of suh\titution, and from (I). 
(HiI 
where (T,, ib the elasticity of substitution in production. Assuming homothctic preferences, the 
elasticity of wbstitution hetwuen consumption per capita and L’~, at the optimum. is given hq 
Suhstitutlng (v) and (i\) Into 1111) yields that I”‘l, ~,, ~0 if 
ri,(rr,,(l,-c,)+~[,,)c“,+(‘. (Vi) 
‘“See Courant and Ruhinfeld (lY7X) for a more thorough analya of this result in a wmewhat 
different model. 
“The aswmption required to ehtahhhh the lemma is admittedly somwhat strong. It can be 
justified on three quite dllTcrent arguments. 
(I) While application of empirical results for \uch a Gmple model is to he undertaken wth 
caution. estimate\ of the two relevant elasticities OI‘C gcnerally les than unity. 
(2) To the extent that publicly provided goods are not purl: public goods. the assumption I\ 
n6t required. If our model uere recast with G=c, ‘c’, there would he no convexity problem, the 
optimality of the uniform allocation. as well as lemma I. could he estahlishcd without resort to 
anything ma-c than ‘normal’ abumptlons about talca and technology. 
(3) The proponents of tax limitation do not hnsc their case on the posslhlc existence of 
perccrse hchavior due to noncon\cxities in productton xts. 
Finally. It \hould be noted that neither assumption 1 I nor Icmma I ia required to establish 
the rcsulth prc~entcd helow in the cast‘ of a single central government. 
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uniform allocation, of course, does not depend upon who holds title to land. 
although the distributional consequences of different allocations will depend 
directly on ownership.i6 Dropping assumption 10 and replacing it with the 
assumption that landlords are absentee permits us to do two things. First, it 
simplifies consideration of the functional distribution of income among 
landlords and workers in both location 1 and the rest of the world. Second, 
it permits us to ignore the effects of land rents on the incomes of workers, 
thus greatly simplifying the analysis of mobility. 
Under the assumption that landlords are absentee, the budget constraint 
facing a private employee will be” 
wp = cp + tqgegle, (9) 
while the constraint facing a public employee will be 
wg = cg + w,e,je. (10) 
The indirect utility function of the private employees, which will prove useful 
in the analysis to follow, will be 
v = V(w,, w,e,,e). (11) 
Finally, the results of the model obtained when e is equal to C/N, \vg= IVY, 
and (6) is maximized subject to (9) and the other constraints of the model 
will be denoted by an asterisk (*), indicating optimal values. 
3. Can public employees utilize their market power? 
In terms of the coverage of our paper there are two conceptually distinct 
reasons for considering a tax limitation policy. One reason arises from a 
model of bureaucratic behavior or voting behavior in which the level of 
public output is increased beyond the efficient level. The analysis of this case 
is presented in section 6. A second reason arises when public employees have 
the potential to raise their wages above the level that would be earned by 
private employees with equivalent skills. The welfare effects of tax limitation 
in this case are analyzed in section 5. We do not spend any time on the case 
in which public employees do not possess market power and output is 
unaffected by bureaucratic behavior simply because tax limitation in such a 
case can only constrain choices optimally made, and thus cannot be socially 
“See Courant (1977) for a proof that although total output must fall in a nonoptimal 
allocation, total returns to either factor (but not both) may rise. 
“For the remainder of the paper, the absence of superscripts implies that we are looking at 
location 1. 
beneficial. However, the analysis in sections 4 and 5 is predicated on the 
assumption that public employees can earn rents by raising their wage. Thus. 
before beginning our tax limitation analysis it is necessary to examine 
carefully the wage determining behavior of the public sector. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we ask under what conditions it 
is possible for public employees in one location to improve their welfare by 
raising the public wage rate, given that private sector mobility is costless. 
Second. we analyze the case in which the use of such market power can be 
effective (and thus cause economic inefficiency) asking whether tax limitation 
will make society better or worse off. At the same time we examine the 
distributional consequences of a tax limitation policy in terms of (a) how 
much of the impact is felt within the tax limitation area, and (b) how the 
gains and losses are distributed among workers in each sector. and 
landowners both in location I and the rest of the world. 
Assume that the economy starts at the global optimum, in which \vg = \vP 
=rv,*, where the asterisk denotes the optimum. Assume also that public 
employees have some ability to control the wage rate and that their market 
power is independent of the level of public employment. Because private 
mobility is costless, there is clearly a limit to the extent to which public 
wages can be increased. What is less clear is whether LIIIJ increase in the 
utility of public employees can be attained by such a policy. The reason is 
that as public wages are increased, private sector outmigration lowers the 
effective tax base (P, since we are using a head tax). If the rate of decrease in 
tax base is sufficiently rapid, public employees will make themselves worse off 
by attempting to earn any rents. 
To pursue this matter further, we note that as \\‘g is increased above IV; 
(for a given ee), the price of public output rises, and private employees are 
made worse off. Following the usual ‘small open city’ assumptions made in 
section 2, outmigration must then occur until (to a close approximation) the 
original level of utility is attained by private employees. Since outmigration 
lowers t’, the price of public output will continue to rise. However. from the 
production function. the decline in e will lower eP and hence raise the private 
sector wage. In equilibrium, .the private employees will be consuming less eg 
and more private goods, bu? attaining essentially the same level of utility. In 
other words, some wage increase will be tolerated by the private sector (i.e. 
will be consistent with spatial equilibrium) simply because private money 
wages will rise as outmigration from location one occurs. 
The result is that there is an inverse relationship between 1~‘~ and e due to 
the mobility of price taking (and utility taking) private employees. With 
private employees choosing c,. this relationship serves as a constraint which 
faces public employees. All points satisfying this relationship are associated 
with an equilibrium in which private employees attain essentially the same 
level of utility. (Although, of course. social welfare falls in response to the 
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increase in ran.) To obtain the slope of the curve defining this constraint, we 
need to calculate de/dw, from the private employees’ indirect utility function, 
the production function for c, and the employees’ demand function for P,. To 
do so we toally differentiate the indirect utility function, setting dV=O 
(relying on our open city, competitive assumptions) and utilizing the fact that 
eg, the demand for public employment, is equal to (- V,/V, ).I8 It follows 
that 
(12) 
where fj is the elasticity of e with respect to 1~~. 
For the reasons given above, 0 must be negative, and in genera1 II will vary 
with M‘~. The actual value of 0 and thus the slope of the constraint facing 
public employees will depend on how the private wage adjusts to the public 
employee behavior. In the simple case of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and Cobb-Douglas utility function, f) is constant, from which it 
follows that de,/dw, falls in absolute value as the public wage is increased. 
What is perhaps more interesting from the analysis is that eq. (12) helps us 
to determine under what conditions it is possible for an increase in public 
wages to make employees better off. The results are summarized in theorems 
1 and 2. 
Theorem 1. A necessury condition fbr public employees to increase utilit!’ (or 
earn additionul rents) hy increclsing wg uhoce ctnq‘ initial level is that 
0 > ( 1 - e/cg ). 
Proof‘ (by contradiction). If Hz (1 -e/e,), then from eq. (12) dw,/dw,z 1, 
implying that private wages rise more than ~3~ as M‘~ rises. But since (12) is 
derived on the assumption that V, (private utility) is constant, and both 
groups receive the same eg at the same price, public employee utility cannot 
be improved unless public wages rise by more than private wages. 
Theorem 2. The condition stated in theorem 1 is ulso sufficient if the initial 
lecel of’ \+‘g is wp. 
Proqf: If dwP/drt’glWpE,,,p < 1 so that public wages increase more than private 
wages, then although public employees do not consume their most desired 
level of ep after raising rvg, they do consume the same amount as do private 
employees, and at the same price. Thus, in order to spend their greater 
income, they must consume more of the consumption good than do private 
18From Roy’s Identity. See, for example. Diamond and McFadden (1974). 
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employees. Since private employee utility is unchanged, public employee 
utility must rise. 
Corollur~ 1. Wherl outrnigratiorl is not possible, public employees cm a1w~y.s 
e0rn rents.” 
We now restrict our consideration to models for whose parameter values 
rent-earning is possible when IVY = \v* = ~7~. We attempt to characterize the 
level of 1~~ which would maximize public sector utility. If eg is assumed fixed, 
the optimal wage can be determined explicitly by maximizing public sector 
consumption of c at the given level of ef ~~ here (‘B = \vg - \~,r,/e. The first- 
order condition is as follows:‘0 
(13) 
This condition for maximization overstates the desired wage, however, 
because it does not account for the fact that as w, rises (and falls) privute 
employees will choose ever lower levels of eg.22 This result is stated and 
proved in the following theorem and corollary. 
(14) 
lgWhen the production function (cP=e;“p/ I “) and utility function (C’=eic’-“) are Cobb 
Douglas, the necessary and sufficient condltlon for public employees to increase their utility by 
raising M‘~ is that 
and V0 is the level of utility attained by the private sector. We might note that one necessary 
condition for the corollary to hold is that K, > I. or solving, ~(1 -p)+2p < 1 which does hold 
for reasonable values of c1 and [j (e.g. r = 0.7, /3 = 0.1; these values are also sufficient). 
“‘This condition is similar to the one found in Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979). 
“This condition is consistent with eq. (12). There we found that when e8/e< 1 (I -0) there are 
still rents to be earned on the margin. Here we see that when the equality holds there will be no 
additional rents tc> be earned and total rents will be maximized. 
“This must be true. With their utility fixed private employees are on a compensated demand 
curve and the price of eg rises. 
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where U, und U, are the partial derivatives qf the public sector emploqee’s 
utility function.23 
Proof. In the public employee utility function, U(c,, eg)= U(M., - rv,e,/e, PJ, 
since consumption cg is determined as a residual after the public output head 
tax is paid. Differentiating with respect to \vg and solving we find that 
(15) 
At the optimum dU/d\c,=O. Using the fact that dU/d\v, =O, we solve to 
obtain the desired result. 
Corollarq~ 2. Thr public wage set under the assumption that eL: remuins,fixed 
is higher than the wuge which is set when eg vuries neguticely b\‘ith ~7~. 
Proof: Since public employees face the same price as private employees and 
have higher incomes when N’~>M.‘~, their desired public output must exceed 
the level actually provided. It follows that U,,‘U, >\\‘,/‘e. In addition, we 
have seen from (13) that e,/e = [l/( 1 - 0)] when changes in ep are not 
accounted for. Substituting into (15), it follows that 
(16) 
Clearly dU/d\r, is negative since the term in brackets is positive and de,/d\v, 
is negative. Furthermore, the greater is 0 [from (14)] the more negative will 
be (16) and hence the more limited will be the ability of the public sector to 
exploit its market power. 
The results of theorems 1, 2 and 3, and the associated corollaries may be 
summarized as follows. 
(1) Even in a perfectly mobile world, a public sector union which possesses 
market power in one locality may be able to increase its utility by setting its 
wage above the competitive wage. Whether this is possible or not depends 
on the form of the utility and production functions. We should note that the 
simultaneous attempt of unions with market power in all jurisdictions to 
achieve their objectives will tend to reduce the likelihood that any one will 
get an improvement. Of course, the actual outcome in such a case depends 
‘“Eq. (14) IS easily interpreted. The term K p..~ ih the average cost of cr facing private 
employees. while the last set of terms on the right-hand side accounts for the fact that due to 
mobility of the private sector, marginal cost exceeds average cost. 
upon the particular choice of game theoretic assumption that one makes. But 
we should note that even when all governments have such market power the 
collectivity of local public governments will still be able to earn rents [see 
Epple and Zelenitz (1980)]. 
(2) When it is possible for a public sector union to increase its utility 
through wage increases, the ability of such a union to exploit market power 
is limited by the mobility of the private sector. The more responsive the 
private sector population is to \\se, the less the public sector employees will 
be able to raise their utility by increasing \t’,. 
4. Tax limitation of a central unified government 
While most tax limitation amendments currently in force in the United 
States apply to state and/or local governments, a move to restrict the 
spending of the national government has also been in progress. Therefore, it 
seems worthwhile to consider the normative analysis of the national 
government case before proceeding to consider the more complex case of 
local tax limitation in a world with many jurisdictions and household 
mobility. 
To treat the central case we need make only a few minor adjustments in 
the model, by assuming that there is only 1 location in the economy and that 
total population is therefore fixed. It remains true that the allocation of 
resources under perfect competition will be optimal, but lemma 1 is no 
longer relevant. As outlined at the beginning of section 3 we consider first 
the case in which public employees earn rents through their use of market 
power over wages, and then the case in which output is too large because of 
Niskanen-like bureaucratic effects. 
As in section 3, to treat the market power case, we must first ask whether 
it is possible for public employees to improve their welfare by raising their 
wage. and the answer is yes, ah expected. Thus, for (I= 0 in theorem 1. the 
necessary condition holds for all c>eg (see footnote 19). Likewise, the 
optimum public wage is given by eq. (I 4), again when 0 is set equal to zero. 
Here, the only limitation on the desire of public employees to raise the wage 
is the lower public output that private employees will choose as the public 
output price rises. 
Assuming for the moment that market power is independent of public 
sector size, what happens when a tax limitation amendment is put into 
effect? Unfortunately, the elementary nature of our model does not allow us 
to discuss the comparative properties of a series of tax and expenditure 
limitation structures. Rather, we consider the effect of limiting total 
expenditure. \cgegr along the lines of a recently suggested U.S. constitutional 
amendment. We assume also that \vBcI: is constrained to be less than the 
current level of spending prior to the enactment of the amendment. With 
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market power unaffected by the amendment, the constraint will be met by a 
reduction in output eg. This clearly makes public employees worse off 
because they were initially consuming fewer public services than they wanted 
at their wage wg. However, it also makes private employees worse off 
because they are constrained so that they can no longer operate on their 
demand curve, receiving less public output and more private consumption 
than would be optimal. A similar result holds when market power is a 
positive function of the size of the public sector. In this case both \vg and e, 
will fall to satisfy the limitation, making public employees worse off. Despite 
the fall in K’~, however, private sector employees will still be made worse off. 
While not nearly so direct, this latter result follows because private 
employees could have limited wg by choosing a lower ep themselves, and 
opted not to do so. Both of these market power results are clarified and 
expanded upon implicitly in section 5 which follows. One need simply 
interpret the central government case as a special case of the model with 
many jurisdictions with all outmigration parameters set equal to zero. All of 
the essential theorems apply when the limitation applies to a national or to a 
local government. 
Noe consider the effect of a limitation on \cgeg when public employees 
actually set the level of public employment eg, assuming for the moment that 
public employees have no market power over wages. We also assume that 
because of taste differences, public employees opt for a higher level of ep than 
that desired by the private sector. In such a case it is immediately clear that 
an expenditure limitation is beneficial to the class of private employees, since 
it brings the level of eg provided in line with their demand. Finally, when 
both ~1~ and eg are controlled by the public sector, the limitation has an 
ambiguous effect on the welfare of the private sector, as one might expect 
given our discussion of the two individual cases. However, the details 
surrounding the fixed ~l’~ case, and the more complicated case in which both 
\.vg and eg are controlled by the public sector are best left to section 6 where 
they are treated in detail. Once again the central case can be seen as a 
special case of the multiple jurisdiction model. 
5. Local tax limitation when public wages exceed private wages 
In this section we consider the effects of tax limitation when public 
employees are able to set wg greater than \t’P.24 First, we analyze the case in 
which the degree of market power is independent of the level of eB. This is 
admittedly a special case, but it serves to make our conclusions clear and 
240ne might expect that the political and bargaining power of public sector unions would be 
greatest when eg is large. However, as eg increases. I -e/r, becomes less negative and rhe 
condition for rent-earning in theorem I becomes more difficult to meet. With private employees 
setting eg, then, public employee market power is likely to be quite weak, while according to 
direct. Second, following Tullock (1974) and othersz5 we consider a case in 
which bargaining power increases with the size of public sector, so that the 
level of \cg is an increasing function of eg. In both cases we assume that the 
level of r, is set by the private sector. and that public employees do not 
achieve condition (14); i.e. they will always use any additional market power 
for the purpose of increasing LV~.” 
The elementary nature of this model does not allow us to discuss the 
comparative properties of a series of tax and expenditure limitation 
structures. Rather. we consider the effect of a ptiblic spending limitation of 
the sort now in effect in several states” in which total expenditures, \vgcg arc 
limited, i.e. in which bvpeg as specified by the limitation is less than the level 
of public spending before its enactment. 
In general, such a constraint may be met by reducing either or both of \i’g 
and pp. Where public employee market power is independent of eg and the 
other assumptions of this section hold, however, the constraint will be met 
by a reduction in cg alone, because public employees’ market power is 
unaffected and public employees will not choose to reduce 1~‘~. Under these 
conditions it is easy to proke: 
PVC+/. The result follows directly from our earlier analysis. First, public 
employees were already underconsuming public output before tax limitation 
was put into place, so that the further reduction must make them worse off. 
Second, the level of eg chosen by the private sector was optimal for the gilen 
wage level 1~~. The fall in ep due to tax limitation, then, will force prikate 
sector employees to underconsume eg at the tax price given at the prc- 
limitation level of C. But our open-city competitive assumptions require that 
private employees receive the same level utility as other private employees in 
the rest of the world. This in turn requires an increase in it’s which can only 
be achieved through a reduction in (1. By lemma I. the decline in t’ must 
1he0rcm I the oppo”“nl1y ftv rcnt-e~irnln~ 011 (IIC margin Ulll hc I-Ci.lll\Cl> I;ll-l$. I Ill\ c;,,, lx 
seen directly from the necessary condition for rent-earning given in the Cobb-Douglas example in 
footnote 19. When /I 15 greater than or equal to 0.5 ((I~ is at least half of e), the necessary 
condition for rent-GII-nlng is ne\er met. Thw, the political condltmn\ for a public cmploycc 
union to set it\ deblrcd wage (large c,) are wch that the desred \+age itself in lihely to be quite 
IOU. For completeness, however. \ve consider the cast whcrc public employee\ arc able to 
achlevc (14) through murhct powc~- at the end of thl\ section. 
“See Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (19791 for an extended bibliography. 
‘“This last assumption 1s especially plausible in light of theorem I. 
“The Headlee amendment, recently passed in Michigan. 1s of this form. Under that provision. 
total expenditure5 are fixed at a fraction of nominal personal income. 
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reduce social welfare. And, by the concavity of the production functions, it 
clearly reduces the utility of private sector workers throughout the world. 
Intuitively, as long as the noncompetitive public sector wage is fixed, and 
the system acts competitively so as to find a second-best solution given that 
wage, all that tax limitation can do is move the system from second best to 
third best, by adding yet another constraint. 
Endogeneity of the ability of public sector workers to set wg higher than 
wP does not alter the preceding analysis substantially. If it is again assumed 
that public employees could always make use of additional market power at 
the margin, then we are in a situation very similar to that dealt with in 
theorem 4. In particular, tax limitation, although it will now lower both eg 
and wg, simply adds a constraint which will serve to prevent private 
employees from behaving efficiently. We summarize the result in the 
following corollary. 
Corollary 3. With public wages an increasing function of eg, tax limitation is 
socially inefficient, and public employee utility cannot increase.28 
Corollary 4. With a fixed public wage rate, tax limitution of a centralized 
un$ed government makes private and public employees worse offi 
The most important aspect of theorem 4 and its corollaries is that under 
the stated assumptions tax limitation has an unambiguously deleterious effect 
on welfare. The key assumptions leading to that result are that the public 
sector’s market power only affects the level of public wages and that the 
degree to which they possess that power is less than they could profitably 
28Assume that the level of wp is an increasing function of eF, i.e. 
w,=r(e,); z’(e,)>O; I\‘&, 2 ,v;. 
Without tax limttation, private employees will maximize their utility functton subject to setting 
the marginal rate of substitution between cD and e, equal to the relevant marginal price ratio. 
which is 
we + r’(e, kg 
That public employees are made no better off is now clear. Had some point on the function 
r(e,) yielded higher utility than that chosen before tax limitation, they could have attained such 
a point by setting the value of IL’~ appropriately. The argument that e must fall is essentially 
identical to that given in the proof of theorem 4. The level of M‘~ chosen by public employees 
prior to the implementation of tax limitation was that which maximized utility subject to the 
function LY(~,). By adding another binding constraint, tax limitation forces private employees to 
underconsume eg. In order to compensate them for this, u’P must rise, which necessitates a 
reduction in e,,. As e, is already falling along r(e,), e must fall, and by lemma 1, utility must fall. 
Furthermore, private employee utility fdlls (somewhat) worldwide, since the increase in )vP in the 
location under consideration tmplies that \cr, must fall everywhere else. 
use. In section 6 we will consider situations in which neither of these 
conditions holds, with the result that tax limitation may improve welfare. 
Another important result obtained in this section is that almost all of the 
costs of public sector power over wages are borne by landlords in the city 
where such power is exercised, and workers in the world as a whole. 
Outmigration may only lead to small changes in the level of utility attainable 
in the system, but it can have large distributional consequences. In particular, 
reductions in eP, the mechanism by which private sector workers’ utilities are 
equalized when 1~~ exceeds N’,,, must lead (given the production function for 
c) to reductions in I’. In the rest of the world, on the other hand, ,L$ falls and 
+ rises. Thus, landlords in the rest of the world clearly gain from 
outmigration from location 1, and landlords in location I lose. Workers in 
the rest of the world also lose, as potential output per person at any cf falls. 
Tax limitation. while it further reduces social welfare, also has 
distributional effects. Again, as outmigration increases due to the tax 
limitation. landlords in location 1 lose, while landlords elsewhere gain and 
workers elsewhere lose. The net effect on landlords as a class is 
indeterminate, although it can be proved that if the production function for (’ 
is Cobb-Douglas, outmigration from location I will reduce aggregate 
landlord income.2” But in all of these cases the most important point is that 
the efficiency costs imposed on workers by both public sector market power 
over wages and by inefficient tax limitation are borne very broadly. The 
costs imposed on landlords, on the other hand, fall completely on those who 
hold title to the land in the location under consideration. Indeed, landlords 
elsewhere achieve small gains. 
It should be emphasized that the preceding results depend on the 
assumption that public employees will ‘not choose to cut their wages in 
response to tax limitation. For reasons given above. we find this case to be 
far more plausible than its opposite one in which public employees, with 
no control over v,, are able to attain their optimal wage as given in eq. (14). 
To be complete, however, we now consider what happens if eq. (14) holds 
prior to the enactment of tax limitation. 
In this case it is possible that public employees would find it beneficial to 
lower the public wage rate in response to tax limitation. The lower wage 
means a loss of money income, but it also lowers the price of public output, 
making private employees better off. and the resulting increase in e lowers 
the price even further. Thus. the result is that private employees will demand 
more ep and at least some of this demand may be accommodated within the 
tax limitation constraint. Whether such a response will occur depends upon 
the extent to which public employees were underconsuming eg initially, and 
upon the willingness of private employees to increase cp. For the ‘right’ 
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parameter values, however, public employees may choose to cut wg enough 
so that e will increase, and hence tax limitation will be of benefit to 
consumers. However, it is also possible that the public sector response will 
be just the opposite. Public employees could choose to increases IVY in 
response to limitation, causing an additional outmigration, and raising the 
tax-price of public services such that eE falls even more. In this case the 
secondary adjustment makes tax limitation more harmful than the initial 
effect. 
6. Local tax limitation when public employees set the level of public output 
In this section we consider the possible effects of tax limitation when 
public employees actually set the level of public employment e8. We first 
analyze such behavior when public employees have no market power over 
wages. Then, we assume that the public wage may be greater than or equal 
to the private wage. The literature on bureaucratic aggrandizement (e.g. 
Niskanen, Romer and Rosenthal, etc.) suggests that public managers have a 
positive preference for large government. In the context of our model, it is 
difficult to introduce a public managerial class. In our model the assumption 
that public employees prefer more public output serves as a simple means of 
introducing that bias into the analysis. The assumption of two sets of utility 
functions makes welfare analysis substantially more complex, however.30 
Since the concern of most analysts lies in the impact on private sector 
employees, we choose to restrict our welfare analysis to that group. We thus 
implicitly view the managers of the public ‘union’ as outside the model.31 
6.1. Tux limitation without murket power over wages 
Our primary result is given in theorem 5. 
Theorem 5. [f public output is lurger than the pricute sector optimum in a 
model without public control over \vage.s. tax limitation (on the margin) will 
henejit private employees bvhile making public employees worse o@ 
Landowners in the directly effected urea gain, btthile landowners ut other 
locutions lose. 
Proof Assume first that public employees have no market power over 
wages, so that cvg= wp at any level of public output. To simplify, we can 
30F~r a more detailed discussion of this issue in a somewhat different context, see Gramlich 
and Rubinfeld (1980). 
“This set of assumptions also allows us to avoid the difficulties arising uhen an employee 
changes employment sectors. Formally, the employee would change utility functions, thereby 
confounding conventional welfare analysis, 
approximate this assumption by fixing w,= wp*= Recall that 
we have assumed that public utility functions differ from private, with public 
employees demanding more public output. If public employees choose eg, 
they will choose a value greater than the original social optimum, so ep 
falls and 5~~ rises. However, private employees are clearly worse off. since 
they could have selected this allocation initially and chose not to. As a result, 
population r falls and the wage M’,, increases further until the level of private 
utility reaches its initial level. With P<(I* and 11’~ = \vP > N$. private 
employees are clearly facin g a hiehcr tax price for public output and thus are L 
overconsuming public output.“” 
Corollar~~ 5. C’rirler the cotditiotls c?f tiworettz 5, tci.y limitation of‘ li centrrrl 
utl$ed gorer)znletlt it2crea.se.s (m the nxrrgitl) the \\,r!filre of’ private etqd0j~ee.s. 
In such a case the effect of tax limitation is clear. The level of public 
output must fall in response to the limitation and at least for small decreases 
in output, e must rise with a corresponding gain in the welfare of private 
34 employees.- Since the initial increase in e, beyond the optimal private sector 
level must have decreased local land values, but increased land values at 
other locations. the converse must occur whe tax limitation is put into effect. 
The analysis is quite similar if we generalize the previous model by 
allowing for a public wage rate that is greater than the private wage N$. 
However, we keep the analysis simple by assuming that the public wage rate 
does not adjust with changes in local policy. (In the language of section 3, 
condition (14) is not met hence \rp is always as high as public employees 
can make it.) From section 3 we have already seen that in the process of 
raising public wages (wnen rent-earning is possible), private employees face a 
higher tax price for public output. and thus choose to consume less pg. If we 
now allow public employees to enforce a higher-level of LJ~ due to their 
bureaucratic power, the private employees will be overconsuming public 
output given the higher tax price that they face. As a result, further 
outmigration will occur, with the usual consequences. The effects of tax 
limitation are then quite clear. When pa falls due to tax limitation, private 
employees are made better off. while public employees are made worse off. 
Summarizing, 
“II” utility functions are identical, the optimal level of (I~ will be chosen. In this case a tax 
limitation amendment which lowers wpeg ~111 clearly harm both public and private employees. 
‘“Public employees will be enjoying a higher money wage wee but will be earning no rents. 
since wr = wp. 
340f course if the tax limitation amendment k too stringent. and the public rector becomes 
too small, so&t> can be worse off. 
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Corollur! 6. Under the conditions of’ theorem 6, tax limitation of’ a crnttwl 
un$ed gozvrnmrrtt (on the mrrrgin) improws the \r,e!firw qf’pt-icute rmp1q~ee.s. 
Now we consider the behavior of the model when public employees 
possess sufficient market power so that they can optimize fully with respect 
to both brg and e8, and choose the levels of both variables subject to the 
constraints imposed by private sector mobility. If we totally differentiate the 
public employees’ direct utility function U(llX - \vgeg,:e. ee) and solve we find 
that the public sector optimum occurs when 
(17) 
where 
Since U,/U, measures (except for a negative sign) the marginal rate of 
substitution between public output and private consumption, eq. (17) tells us 
that (a) the greater tha rate of private outmigration in response to an 
increase in eg the lower the level of public output selected, and (b) the greater 
the rate of outmigration in response to a wage increase the greater the 
chosen level of eg, and implicitly the lower the chosen wage increase. 
In order to evaluate the possible effects of tax limitation, fig. 1 will be of 
value. Curve A-B depicts the private sector constraint boundary, 
representing all possible combinations of 1~~ and P% which keep private utility 
constant. We have drawn the curve to be downward sloping and bounding a 
convex set to simplify the analysis, but other relationships are possible. 
Curve C-D describes the ‘locally’ determined public sector ‘indifference’ 
curves. in which public wages and public output are traded off, holding e 
constant. These indifference curves differ from standard indifference curves, 
first because wages rather than the private good are traded off against public 
output, and second because the whole set of indifferences curves shifts or 
changes as we move from point to point in the figure, since e, total 
population, and the tax-price also change. To examine the slope of such 




function, keeping r constant. The slope is given as follows: 
(18) 
This slope is always negative in the neighborhood of the optimum, because 
U,/U, >b~Je.~ We should point out, however. that the indifference curves 
need not be convex as shown. 
What effect will tax limitation have in such a case‘? Represented in u’~ -eg 
space, the tax limitati’on constraint is a hyperbola such as the one which 
passes through points F and G. The effect of the constraint is to alter the 
private sector constraint boundary from curve A-B. to curve A F-H-G-B. 
The public sector is forced to alter M’, and eg so as to reach a point on this 
boundary. Any move from the old boundary (A-B) will make the public 
sector worse off, so the problem becomes one of minimizing the utility loss 
involved. To consider some of the possibilities, note first that if M‘~ remains 
fixed and eg falls, the private sector is clearly worse off and e must fall to 
allow for compensation. On the other hand, if M‘~ falls and e, is fixed, the 
private sector is clearly better off, and e rises. There is therefore some 
jSThe reason follows from the argument in section 3, namely that wg. ‘L’ represents the average 
rather than the marginal cost of public output. For small changes in cr. the price that the public 
sector faces is higher than W~;E because of the private sector response that occurs. ix. 
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combination of lower M?~ and eg which maintains e fixed, which we have 
drawn as occurring along curve E-H. Thus, all points within the shaded area 
and on the boundary EHG represent resource allocations in which private 
employee welfare is increased. Thus, in order to find the effect of tax 
limitation on social welfare, we need only to find whether the point chosen 
constraint on A-F-H-G-B lies to the left or right of H. 
A careful look at the maximization decision of public employees makes it 
clear, however, that either possibility can occur. In fact, there is nothing 
inherent in the shape of the local indifference curves that disallows corner 
solutions at either F or G. One way to get some intuition about 
conditions that allow for these possibilities is to compare eq. (18) to 
slope of the tax limitation constraint, i.e. 
the 
the 
By comparing the slope of the indifference curve at H to the slope given in 
(19) we can tell whether private employees will be made better or worse off. 
For example, if the slope of the indifference curve is steeper (more negative) 
at H, we know that public employees will opt to move towards G, resulting 
in an increase in private employee utility. On the other hand, comparing (18) 
and (19) we note that an indifference curve less negative than (19) will cause 
public employees to prefer points to the left of H, implying outmigration and 
a decrease in private employee welfare. Equating (18) and (19) makes it clear 
that an improvement in private employee welfare occurs when 
(20) 
1 - e,/e 
or when w&e,> UJU,. Note that when UJU, =w,je, the numerator is 
unambiguously positive. However, because U,/Ui >w,/e, a negative result is 
possible. To examine this somewhat differently, we might re-examine (17) the 
conditions for optimality. Clearly, whether wg/eg > U,/U, depends upon the 
relative values of I* and 8. Either outcome is possible.36 The result is that tax 
limitation can be socially beneficial or harmful depending upon the nature of 
the constraints on public behavior to private mobility and upon the nature 
of the public sector response, a function of the tastes of public employees. 
“Briefly consider how the analysis changes when K~=~(c~)M.~, where u(O)= I, r’>O. A typical 
situation is drawn in fig. 2. At low levels of eg public employees have no market power, so that 
the only wage possible is close to M‘~, As ep increaseh, the ability to control wy also increases. 
However, the threat of outmigration by private employees necessitates that the level of \ry, 
chosen actually falls for sufficiently large levels of r,. The modified constraint facing public 
employees is given by curve A-B. We expect the optimum to be at a point E to the right of the 
peak. From the point of view of public employees, points such as D are always dominated by C 




7. Concluding remarks 
The major conclusion that can be drawn from the preceding analysis is a 
cautionary one: even if it ia known that the total resources devoted to a local 
public sector exceed those that would be competitively chosen, economic 
welfare will be enhanced by tax limitation only under certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, tthe question of whether tax limitation will be appropriate 
public policy does not turn simply on the extent to which public employee 
organizations possess market and political power. Rather, it depends LI~OII 
the objectives of such organizations and the way in which they utilize their 
market power. This result holds even in the extreme (and highly unlikely) 
case in which a public sector union can set both the public wage and the 
level of public output sub.ject only to the constraint that private employees 
are mobile. 
The bulk of the analysis in this paper has been devoted to two 
conceptually quite distinct ways in which government can be too large. If 
government is too large in the sense that wages are higher than they would 
be in competitive markets, it was found that tax limitation would be 
unambiguously harmful when the level of output was set by informed and 
rational private sector voters. On the other hand, if government is too large 
because public managers are able to set output at higher levels than would 
P.N. Courant and D.L. Rubinfeld, The werfare ej’ds qf tu.x limitation 315 
be chosen competitively, tax limitation was shown to be unambiguously 
helpful (from the private perspective) provided that the limitation is not too 
stringent.37 
The paper did not consider formally what might be termed a mixed case, 
in which public employees are able to exercise market power and achieve 
some rents, and public managers are able to exercise bureaucratic power to 
achieve higher levels of output than would be chosen at prevailing tax prices. 
To the extent that such a mixed case applies in reality, the welfare effects of 
tax limitation will turn on the effect of such a policy on the intra-public 
sector division of market power. If the limitation tends to weaken the 
position of public employees vis-i-vis managers, rents earned by individual 
public employees could be expected to fall, but the size of public 
employment could increase. The welfare effects here are ambiguous. If the 
position of managers is weakened, eg would fall, but \vg could rise, and the 
effects are again ambiguous. If both parties maintain their positions with 
regard to each other, we would expect to observe decreases in both e, and 
M’~. As before, welfare would be increased to the extent that the limitation 
was not excessively stringent. In any event, the issue of the relationship 
between employment maximizing managers and income maximizing public 
employees deserves more consideration in the literature, which has usually 
focused on the relationship between only one of these parties and private 
sector voters. Thus. a more extensive policy analysis than ours needs a 
formal model which captures both of these potential causes of excessive 
government size, and the interaction between them. 
This last conclusion strengthens what is perhaps the major result of this 
paper - that there is no simple test for discovering whether tax limitation 
will be harmful or helpful. even given that local government is too large. This 
result, combined with the obvious costs in lost flexibility and responsiveness 
associated with tax limitation should motivate a search for other mechanisms 
to ‘control’ local government, at least until we are able to design, develop 
and calibrate models that permit empirically useful predictions of the welfare 
effects of tax limitation. 
“‘It should be noted that this could be a real problem in practice. Even if one were certain 
that ~$3~ was competitively set and that cg was too high, one would have to design a limitation 
such that the limited level of ep was not too low. This would require detailed and accurate 
knowledge of demand functions for public services. 
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